01The Categorical Imperative
The foundational principle of Kantian ethics: act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
Evidence: Kant writes, 'There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.'
02Duty and Moral Worth
Actions have moral worth only when done from duty, not from inclination or self-interest.
Evidence: Kant states, 'An action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined.'
03Autonomy of the Will
The will is autonomous when it gives itself its own law, rather than being subject to external influences.
Evidence: Kant asserts, 'Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition).'
04Duties of Virtue vs. Legal Duties
Ethics deals with duties of virtue that involve internal self-constraint, while legal duties are external and enforceable.
Evidence: Kant explains, 'Ethics, however, seeing that its laws are those of free action in general, includes also the duties which are directly legal; but it does not give the latter the name of ethical duties.'
05Ends and Means
Rational beings are ends in themselves and must never be used merely as means.
Evidence: Kant writes, 'Act so as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.'
06Synthetic A Priori Judgments
Kant identifies synthetic a priori judgments as the foundation of pure mathematics and natural science, and the central problem for metaphysics. They combine necessity and universality with extension of knowledge beyond mere analysis.
Evidence: Kant asks: 'How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?' (Prol. §4) and later states: 'Mathematical judgements are all synthetical' (Prol. §2). He explains that judgments of experience are all synthetical (Prol. §2), while judgments in metaphysics must be synthetic a priori.
07Copernican Revolution in Philosophy
Kant proposes that objects must conform to our cognition rather than cognition to objects, reversing the traditional view. This allows a priori knowledge of objects by presupposing that we cognize only appearances, not things-in-themselves.
Evidence: Kant writes: 'Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects... Let us once try whether we do not get farther... by assuming that objects must conform to our knowledge.' (Prol. Preamble). He calls this the 'Copernican hypothesis... the first experiment of Copernicus' (Prol. Preamble).
08Limits of Reason
Kant argues that reason inevitably oversteps its bounds when it seeks knowledge beyond possible experience, leading to antinomies and illusions. Metaphysics as science must therefore be a critique of pure reason, not a transcendent system.
Evidence: Kant says: 'The chief point... is this: that pure reason is really occupied with nothing but itself' (Prol. §57). He warns: 'Reason has the peculiar fate... that it is burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss... but which it also cannot answer' (Prol. Preamble).
09Phenomena and Noumena
Kant distinguishes appearances (phenomena), which are subject to the a priori forms of intuition and understanding, from things-in-themselves (noumena), which are unknowable. This distinction is crucial for limiting knowledge to experience while leaving room for faith and morality.
Evidence: Kant states: 'We cannot possibly conceive the possibility of a thing in itself' (Prol. §13, Remark 3). He adds: 'All that is here conceded is... that we are not in a position to know what objects may be in themselves' (Prol. §32).
010The Role of Experience
While a priori concepts structure experience, Kant insists that knowledge begins with experience and is limited to its domain. Metaphysics cannot transcend experience; it can only explicate the a priori conditions that make experience possible.
Evidence: Kant writes: 'All our knowledge begins with experience' but 'it does not all arise out of experience' (Prol. Preamble). He clarifies: 'The understanding borrows nothing from experience... yet it must apply them to experience' (Prol. §22).
011Metaphysics as a Science
Kant proposes that metaphysics can become a science if it adopts the method of critique, restricting itself to the a priori principles of possible experience. This requires a systematic inventory of the a priori concepts and principles of the understanding.
Evidence: Kant declares: 'Metaphysics is a completely isolated speculative cognition of reason... a science of the principles of a priori knowledge' (Prol. Preamble). He later says: 'The proper method of metaphysics is... to analyse the faculty of reason itself' (Prol. §35).